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Exponential decreasing rate of leaked information
in universal random privacy amplification
Masahito Hayashi
Abstract—We derive a new upper bound for Eve’s information
in secret key generation from a common random number without
communication. This bound improves on Bennett[7]’s bound
based on the Re´nyi entropy of order 2 because the bound
obtained here uses the Re´nyi entropy of order 1+s for s ∈ [0, 1].
This bound is applied to a wire-tap channel. Then, we derive an
exponential upper bound for Eve’s information. Our exponent is
compared with Hayashi[8]’s exponent. For the additive case, the
bound obtained here is better. The result is applied to secret key
agreement by public discussion.
Index Terms—exponential rate, non-asymptotic setting, secret
key agreement, universal hash function, wire-tap channel
I. INTRODUCTION
THE study of secure communication in the presence of aneavesdropper began with Wyner[10]. Following Wyner,
Csisza´r & Ko¨rner[3] dealt with this topic. In this study, we
consider a sender Alice, an authorized receiver Bob and an
unauthorized receiver Eve, who is referred to as a wire-tapper.
This research treats two channels, a channel to Bob and a
channel to Eve; such a model is called a wire-tap channel.
Whereas the studies above treated the discrete memoryless
case, Hayashi[8] derived a general capacity formula for an
arbitrary sequence of wire-tap channels. In this model, amount
of Eve’s accessible information is evaluated by the mutual
information IE(Φ) between Alice’s and Eve’s variables with
the code Φ, and is abbreviated to Eve’s information. Several
papers [14], [16], [21] in cryptography community adopt the
leaked information criterion based on the variational distance
while several papers [2], [3], [8], [10], [17], [18] in information
theory community adopt the leaked information criterion based
on the mutual information. As is illustrated in Appendix III,
there exists an example where the leaked information criterion
based on the mutual information is more restrictive than that
based on variational distance. Hence, we adopt the leaked
information criterion based on the mutual information.
As was shown by Csisza´r [17], in the discrete memoryless
case, if the transmission rate is less than the capacity and
if we choose suitable codes, Eve’s information goes to zero
exponentially. That is, when the given channel is used with
n times, Eve’s information IE(Φn) with a suitable code
Φn behaves as e−nr. In order to estimate the speed of the
convergence, we focus on the exponential decreasing rate of
Eve’s information, which is referred to as the exponent of
M. Hayashi is with Graduate School of Information Sciences,
Tohoku University, Aoba-ku, Sendai, 980-8579, Japan (e-mail:
hayashi@math.is.tohoku.ac.jp)
Eve’s information:
lim
n→∞
−1
n
log IE(Φn). (1)
Hayashi[8] estimates this exponent for the wire-tap channels
in the discrete memoryless case. This type of evaluation is
quite useful for estimating Eve’s information from a finite-
length code. The first purpose of this paper is to improve the
previous exponent of Eve’s information.
On the other hand, using the Re´nyi entropy of order 2,
Bennett et al [7] evaluate Eve’s information after the applica-
tion of a universal2 hashing function[4]. Their result gives an
upper bound of Eve’s information for the generation of a secret
key from a common random number without communication.
Renner and Wolf [16] and Renner [14] improved this approach
and obtained evaluations based on smooth Re´nyi entropy.
Renner [14] applied his method to the security analysis of
quantum key distribution. However, no research studied the
relation between these results related to various kinds of Re´nyi
entropies and the above results concerning wire-tap channel.
The main purpose of this paper is to generalize Bennett et al
[7]’s result and to apply it to wire-tap channel model. As the
first step, in Section II, we focus on secret key generation from
a common random number without communication. Even in
this model, we highlight the exponent of Eve’s information in
the case of independent and identical distribution (i.i.d. case).
In subsection II-A, we extend the result of Bennett et al [7]
to the case of the Re´nyi entropy of order 1 + s for s ∈ [0, 1]
and obtain a new upper bound for Eve’s information in this
problem as the main theorem. We apply this bound to the i.i.d.
case. Then, derived a lower bound of the exponent of Eve’s
information. In subsection II-B, we also apply Renner and
Wolf [16]’s method to the evaluation of the exponent of Eve’s
information. Then, another lower bound is derived based on
smooth Re´nyi entropy. It is shown that the lower bound based
on Re´nyi entropy of order 1 + s is better than that based on
smooth Re´nyi entropy.
In Section III, based on universal2 hash function, we derive
an upper bound for Eve’s information from random coding
in a wire-tap channel. The method we present contrasts with
the method in Hayashi[8]. Hayashi[8] deals with channel
resolvability and applies it to the security of wire-tap channel;
This approach was strongly motivated by Devetak [11] and
Winter et al [12]. In Section IV, we show that this upper
bound for Eve’s information is better than Hayashi[8]’s bound
for the wire-tap channel model.
In a realistic setting, it is usual to restrict our codes to linear
codes. However, no existing result gives a code satisfying the
2following conditions: (1) The code is constructed by linear
codes. (2) Eve’s information exponentially goes to zero when
the transmission rate is smaller than the difference between the
mutual information from Alice to Bob and that to Eve. In Sec-
tion V, we make a code satisfying the above conditions. That
is, we make our code generated by a combination of arbitrary
linear codes and privacy amplification by the concatenation
of Toeplitz matrix [6] and the identity. Under this kinds of
code, applying the evaluation obtained in subsection II-A and
the concavity property of the key quantity given in III, we
obtain another upper bound for Eve’s information. when the
channel is an additive channel, i.e., the probability space and
the set of input signals are given as the same finite module
and the probability transition matrix Wa(b) corresponding to
the channel is given as P (a−b) with a probability distribution
on the finite module. This fact holds when the channel is a
variant of an additive channel.
In Section VI, we also apply our result to secret key
agreement with public discussion, which has been treated
by Ahlswede & Csisza´r[2], Maurer[1], and Muramatsu[15]
et al. Maurer [1] and Ahlswede & Csisza´r[2] showed that
the optimal key generation rate is the difference of condi-
tional entropies H(A|E) − H(A|B), where A, B, E are
the random variables for Alice, Bob, and Eve, respectively.
Csisza´r[17], Renner[14], and Naito et al [18] mentioned the
existence of a bound for Eve’s information that exponentially
goes to zero when the key generation rate is smaller than
H(A|E)−H(A|B). However, no existing result clearly gives
a lower bound for the exponential decreasing rate for Eve’s
information when the key generation rate is smaller than
H(A|E) − H(A|B). Applying our result, we obtain such a
lower bound for the exponential decreasing rate for Eve’s
information. In this case, we apply our code to a wire-tap
channel with a variant of additive channels. Our protocol can
be realized by a combination of a linear code and privacy
amplification by the concatenation of Toeplitz matrix [6] and
the identity.
In Appendix A, we prove the main theorem mentioned in
Section II. In Appendix B, we show that the concatenation
of Toeplitz matrix [6] and the identity is a universal2 hashing
function [4].
II. SECRET KEY GENERATION WITHOUT COMMUNICATION
A. Method based on Re´nyi entropy of order 1 + s
Firstly, we consider the secure key generation problem from
a common random number a ∈ A which has been partially
eavesdropped on by Eve. For this problem, it is assumed that
Alice and Bob share a common random number a ∈ A, and
Eve has another random number e ∈ E , which is correlated
to the random number a. The task is to extract a common
random number f(a) from the random number a ∈ A, which
is almost independent of Eve’s random number e ∈ E . Here,
Alice and Bob are only allowed to apply the same function
f to the common random number a ∈ A. In order to discuss
this problem, for s ∈ [0, 1], we define the functions
H˜1+s(X |P
X) := − log
∑
x
PX(x)1+s
H˜1+s(X |Y |P
X,Y ) := − log
∑
x,y
P Y (y)PX|Y (x|y)1+s
= − log
∑
x,y
PX,Y (x, y)1+sP Y (y)−s.
Using these functions, we can define Re´nyi entropy of order
1 + s
H1+s(X |P
X) :=
H˜1+s(X |P
X)
s
and the conditional Re´nyi entropy of order 1 + s:
H1+s(X |Y |P
X,Y ) :=
H˜1+s(X |Y |P
X,Y )
s
.
If there is no possibility for confusion, PX,Y is omitted.
Now, we focus on an ensemble of the functions fX from A
to {1, . . . ,M}, where X denotes a random variable describing
the stochastic behavior of the function f . An ensemble of the
functions fX is called universal2 when it satisfies the following
condition[4]:
Condition 1: ∀a1 6= ∀a2 ∈ A, the probability that
fX(a1) = fX(a2) is at most 1M .
We sometimes require the following additional condition:
Condition 2: For any X, the cardinality of f−1
X
{i} does not
depend on i.
This condition will be used in Section III.
Indeed, when the cardinality |A| is a power of a prime power
q and M is another power of the same prime power q, an
ensemble {fX} satisfying the both conditions is given by the
the concatenation of Toeplitz matrix and the identity (X, I)[6]
only with logq |A| − 1 random variables taking values in the
finite filed Fq. That is, the matrix (X, I) has small complexity.
The construction and its proof are given in Appendix B.
When M is an arbitrary integer and the cardinality |A| is
an arbitrary multiple of M , an ensemble {fX} satisfying the
both conditions is given in the following way. First, we fix
a function f from A to {1, . . . ,M} such that the cardinality
|f−1{i}| is |A|M . We randomly choose an permutation σ ∈ SA
on A with the uniform distribution, where SA denotes the set
of permutation on A. So, we can make a random function
{f ◦ σ}A. This ensemble satisfies the both conditions.
As is shown in the Appendix A, we obtain the following
theorem.
Theorem 1: When the ensemble of the functions {fX} is
universal2, it satisfies
EXH(fX(A)|E|P
A,E) ≥ logM −
M se−H˜1+s(A|E|P
A,E)
s
= logM −
es(logM−H1+s(A|E|P
A,E))
s (2)
for 0 < ∀s ≤ 1.
Note that Bennett et al [7] proved this inequality for the case
of s = 1.
3Since the mutual information
I(fX(A) : E|P
A,E) := H(fX(A)|P
A)−H(fX(A)|E|P
A,E)
is bounded by logM −H(fX(A)|E|PA,E), we obtain
EXI(fX(A) : E|P
A,E) ≤
M se−H˜1+s(A|E|P
A,E)
s
, 0 < s ≤ 1.
(3)
This inequality implies the following theorem.
Theorem 2: There exists a function f from A to
{1, . . . ,M} such that
I(f(A) : E) ≤
M se−H˜1+s(A|E|P
A,E)
s
=
es(logM−H1+s(A|E|P
A,E))
s
, 0 ≤ ∀s ≤ 1.
(4)
In the following, we mainly use the quantity
H˜1+s(A|E|P
A,E) instead of H1+s(A|E|PA,E). because
the usage of H1+s(A|E|PA,E) requires more complicated
calculation.
Next, we consider the case when our distribution PAnEn
is given by the n-fold independent and identical distribution
of PAE , i.e, (PA,E)n. Ahlswede and Csisza´r [2] showed that
the optimal generation rate
G(PAE)
:= sup
{(fn,Mn)}

 limn→∞
logMn
n
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
lim
n→∞
I(fn(An) : En)
n
= 0
lim
n→∞
H(fn(An))
logMn
= 1


equals the conditional entropy H(A|E). That is, the generation
rate R = limn→∞
logMn
n is smaller than H(A|E), Eve’s
information I(fn(An) : En) goes to zero. In order to treat the
speed of this convergence, we focus on the supremum of the
exponentially decreasing rate (exponent) of I(fn(An) : En)
for a given R
eI(P
AE |R)
:= sup
{(fn,Mn)}
{
lim
n→∞
− log I(fn(An) : En)
n
∣∣∣∣ limn→∞− logMnn ≤R
}
.
Since the relation H˜1+s(An|En|(PA,E)n) =
nH˜1+s(A|E|P
A,E) holds, the inequality (4) implies that
eI(P
AE |R) ≥ max
0≤s≤1
H˜1+s(A|E|P
A,E)− sR
= max
0≤s≤1
s(H1+s(A|E|P
A,E −R) (5)
Since ddsH˜1+s(A|E|P
A,E)
∣∣∣
s=0
= H(A|E), Eve’s informa-
tion I(fn(An) : En) exponentially goes to zero for R <
H(A|E).
B. Method based on smooth min-entropy
Re´nyi entropy of order 2 H2(A|E|PA,E) is bounded by the
min-entropy
Hmin(A|E|P
A,E) := min
a,e:PA,E(a,e)>0
− logPA|E(a|e),
i.e., the inequality
H2(A|E|P
A,E) ≥ Hmin(A|E|P
A,E)
holds. Then, (2) with s = 1 yields that
EX logM +H(E|P
A,E)−H(fX(A)E|P
A,E)
=EX logM −H(fX(A)|E|P
A,E)
≤Me−Hmin(A|E|P
A,E). (6)
Renner and Wolf [16] introduced the smooth min-entropy:
Hǫmin(A|E|P
A,E)
:= max
Ω:PA,E(Ω)≥1−ǫ
min
(a,e)∈Ω
− logPA|E(a|e). (7)
for ǫ ≥ 0. This definition is different from that of Renner [14].
Modifying the discussion by Renner and Wolf [16], we can
derive another upper bound of EXI(fX(A) : E) based on the
smooth min-entropy Hǫmin(A|E|PA,E) in the following way.
Using the variational distance d(PX , P˜X):
d(PX , P˜X) :=
∑
x
|PX(x)− P˜X(x)|,
we have the continuity of the Shannon entropy in the following
sense: When d(PX , P˜X) ≤ 1e , the function
η(x, a) := −x log x+ xa
satisfies the following inequality:
|H(X |P˜X)−H(X |PX)|
≤η(d(PX , P˜X), log |X |).
Based on the variational distance, we define the following
modification:
Hˆǫmin(A|E|P
A,E)
:= max
P˜A,E
{Hmin(A|E|P˜
A,E)|d(P˜A,E , PA,E) ≤ ǫ}, (8)
where P˜A,E is a probability distribution.
For 0 < ǫ < 1/2, we choose Ω satisfying the condition
in (7). Then, pA|Emax(Ω) := max(a,e)∈Ω PA|E(a|e) ≥ 1|A| . We
define the joint distribution P˜A,E(a, e) satisfying P˜E(e) =
PE(e) in the following way. For this purpose, it is sufficient to
define the conditional distribution P˜A|E(a|e) for all e. When
(a, e) ∈ Ω, the conditional distribution P˜A|E(a|e) is defined
by
P˜A|E(a|e) :=
{
PA|E(a|e) if PA|E(a|e) ≤ pA|Emax(Ω)
p
A|E
max(Ω) if PA|E(a|e) > pA|Emax(Ω).
When (a, e) /∈ Ω, we define P˜A|E(a|e) satisfying that
PA|E(a|e) ≤ P˜A|E(a|e) ≤
1
|A|
,∑
(a,e)/∈Ω
(P˜A|E(a|e)− PA|E(a|e))
=
∑
(a,e)∈Ω
(PA|E(a|e)− P˜A|E(a|e)).
4Then, d(P˜A,E , PA,E) ≤ 2ǫ. Since
Hmin(A|E|P˜
A,E) ≥ − log pA|Emax,
we have
Hˆ2ǫmin(A|E|P
A,E) ≥ Hǫmin(A|E|P
A,E).
When P˜A,E satisfies the condition given in (8),
|(H(E|PA,E)−H(fX(A)E|P
A,E))
− (H(E|P˜A,E)−H(fX(A)E|P˜
A,E))|
≤2η(ǫ, log |A| ·M).
Hence,
EXI(fX(A) : E|P
A,E)
≤EX logM +H(E|P
A,E)−H(fX(A)E|P
A,E)
≤EX logM +H(E|P˜
A,E)−H(fX(A)E|P˜
A,E)
+ 2η(ǫ, log |A| ·M)
≤Me−Hmin(A|E|P˜
A,E) + 2η(ǫ, log |A| ·M)
≤Me−Hˆ
ǫ
min(A|E|P
A,E) + 2η(ǫ, log |A| ·M)
≤Me−H
ǫ/2
min(A|E|P
A,E) + 2η(ǫ, log |A| ·M).
Thus, we obtain an alternative bound of EXI(fX(A) :
E|PA,E) as follows.
EXI(fX(A) : E|P
A,E)
≤Imin,M (A|E|P
A,E)
:= min
1/4>ǫ>0
Me−H
ǫ
min(A|E|P
A,E) + 2η(2ǫ, log |A| ·M)
≤ min
R′≥log 4|A|
Me−R
′
+ 2η(2PA,E{PA|E(a|e) ≥ e−R
′
}, log |A| ·M). (9)
Using (9), we can evaluate eI(PAE |R) as follows.
eI(P
AE |R) ≥ lim
n→∞
−1
n
log Imin,enR(A|E|(P
A,E)n)
Crame´r Theorem yields that
lim
n→∞
−1
n
log(PA,E)n{(PA|E)n(a|e) ≥ e−nR
′
}
=max
s≥0
H˜1+s(A|E|P
A,E)− sR′.
Thus,
lim
n→∞
−1
n
logPn(R
′) = max
s≥0
H˜1+s(A|E|P
A,E)− sR′.
where
Pn(R
′)
:=η(2(PA,E)n{(PA|E)n(a|e) ≥ e−nR
′
}, log |A|nenR).
Therefore,
lim
n→∞
−1
n
log Imin,enR(A|E|(P
A,E)n)
= max
R′:R′≥R
min{max
s≥0
H˜1+s(A|E|P
A,E)− sR′, R′ −R}.
maxs≥0 H˜1+s(A|E|P
A,E) − sR′ is continuous and mono-
tone decreasing concerning R′ and R′ − R is continuous
and monotone increasing concerning R′. Thus, the above
maximum is attained when maxs≥0 H˜1+s(A|E|PA,E) −
sR′ = R′ − R. Let s0 be the parameter s attaining the
above. Then, H˜1+s0(A|E|PA,E) − s0R′ = R′ − R and
d
dsH˜1+s0(A|E|P
A,E)|s=s0 = R
′
. Thus,
max
R′:R′≥R
min{max
s≥0
H˜1+s(A|E|P
A,E)− sR′, R′ −R}
=
1
1 + s0
H˜1+s0(A|E|P
A,E)−
s0
1 + s0
R
=max
s≥0
1
1 + s
H˜1+s(A|E|P
A,E)−
s
1 + s
R (10)
=max
s≥0
s
1 + s
(H1+s(A|E|P
A,E)−R), (11)
where the equation (10) can be checked by taking the deriva-
tive. This value is smaller than the bound given by (5). One
might want to apply the formula
Hǫmin(A) ≥ H1+s(A) +
log ǫ
s
given by Renner and Wolf[19] to the evaluation of
Imin,M (A|E|P
A,E). However, this application does not sim-
plify our derivation. So, we do not apply this formula.
III. THE WIRE-TAP CHANNEL IN A GENERAL FRAMEWORK
Next, we consider the wire-tap channel model, in which the
eavesdropper (wire-tapper), Eve and the authorized receiver
Bob receive information from the authorized sender Alice. In
this case, in order for Eve to have less information, Alice
chooses a suitable encoding. This problem is formulated as
follows. Let Y and Z be the probability spaces of Bob
and Eve, and X be the set of alphabets sent by Alice.
Then, the main channel from Alice to Bob is described by
WB : x 7→ WBx , and the wire-tapper channel from Alice
to Eve is described by WE : x 7→ WEx . In this setting,
Alice chooses M distributions Q1, . . . , QM on X , and she
generates x ∈ X subject to Qi when she wants to send the
message i ∈ {1, . . . ,M}. Bob prepares M disjoint subsets
D1, . . . ,DM of Y and judges that a message is i if y belongs to
Di. Therefore, the triplet (M, {Q1, . . . , QM}, {D1, . . . ,DM})
is called a code, and is described by Φ. Its performance is
given by the following three quantities. The first is the size
M , which is denoted by |Φ|. The second is the average error
probability ǫB(Φ):
ǫB(Φ)
def
=
1
M
M∑
i=1
WBQi (D
c
i ),
and the third is Eve’s information regarding the transmitted
message IE(Φ):
IE(Φ)
def
=
∑
i
1
M
D(WEQi‖W
E
Φ ), W
E
Φ
def
=
∑
i
1
M
WEQi .
5In order to calculate these values, we introduce the following
quantities.
φ(s|W, p) := log
∑
y
(∑
x
p(x)(Wx(y))
1/(1−s)
)1−s
ψ(s|W, p) := log
∑
y
(∑
x
p(x)(Wx(y))
1+s
)
Wp(y)
−s,
where Wp(y) :=
∑
x p(x)Wx(y). The following lemma gives
the properties of these quantities.
Lemma 1: [13] The function p 7→ eφ(s|W,p) is convex for
s ∈ [−1, 0], and is concave for s ∈ [0, 1].
Proof: The convexity and concavity of p 7→ eφ(s|W,p)
follow from the convexity and concavity of x1−s for the
respective parameter s.
Now, using the functions φ(s) and ψ(s), we make a
code for the wire-tap channel based on the random coding
method. For this purpose, we make a protocol to share a
random number. First, we generate the random code Φ(Y)
with size LM , which is described by the LM independent
and identical random variables Y subject to the distribution
p on X . For integers k = 1, . . . , LM let D′k(Y) be the
maximum likelihood decoder of the code Φ(Y). Gallager [13]
showed that the ensemble expectation of the average error
probability concerning decoding the input message A is less
than (ML)seφ(−s|WB ,p) for 0 ≤ s ≤ 1. Here, we choose
a function fX from a function ensemble {fX} satisfying
Conditions 1 and 2. After sending the random variable A
taking values in the set with the cardinality ML, Alice and
Bob apply the function fX to the random variable A and
generate another piece of data of size M . Then, Alice and
Bob share random variable fX(A) with size M . This protocol
is denoted by Φ(X,Y)′
Let E be the random variable of the output of Eve’s channel
WE , and fΦ(Y) be the map defined by the code Φ(Y) from
the message space {1, . . . ,ML} to X . Then as is shown in
Appendix D, we obtain
EYEX|YIE(Φ(X,Y)
′) ≤
1
sLs
eψ(s|W,p) 0 < s ≤ 1. (12)
Now, we make a code for wire-tap channel by modifying the
above protocol Φ(X,Y)′. First, we choose the distribution
Qi to be the uniform distribution on f−1X {i}. When Alice
wants to send the message i, before sending the random
variable A, Alice generates the random number A subject to
the distribution Qi. Alice sends the random variable A. Bob
recovers the random variable A and Applies the function fX.
Then, Bob decodes Alice’s message i, and this code for wire-
tap channel WB,WE is denoted by Φ(X,Y). Since Condition
2 guarantees that the cardinality |f−1
X
{i}| does not depend
on i, the protocol Φ(X,Y) has the same performance as the
above protocol Φ(X,Y)′.
Finally, we consider what code is derived from the above
random coding discussion. Using the Markov inequality, we
obtain
PX,Y{ǫB(Φ(X,Y)) ≤ 2EX,YǫB(Φ(X,Y))}
c <
1
2
PX,Y{IE(Φ(X,Y)) ≤ 2EX,YIE(Φ(X,Y))}
c <
1
2
.
Therefore, the existence of a good code is guaranteed in the
following way. That is, we give the concrete performance of
a code whose existence is shown in the above random coding
method.
Theorem 3: There exists a code Φ for any integers L,M ,
and any probability distribution p on X such that
|Φ| =M
ǫB(Φ) ≤ 2 min
0≤s≤1
(ML)seφ(−s|W
B ,p) (13)
IE(Φ) ≤ 2 min
0≤s≤1
eψ(s|W
E ,p)
Lss
. (14)
In fact, Hayashi [8] proved a similar result when the right
hand side of (14) is replaced by 2min0≤s≤1/2 e
φ(s|WE,p)
Lss .
In the n-fold discrete memoryless channels WBn and
WEn of the channels WB and WE , the additive equation
φ(s|WBn , p) = nφ(s|WB , p) holds. Thus, there exists a code
Φn for any integers Ln,Mn, and any probability distribution
p on X such that
|Φn| = Mn
ǫB(Φ) ≤ 2 min
0≤s≤1
(MnLn)
senφ(−s|W
B ,p)
IE(Φn) ≤ 2 min
0≤s≤1
enψ(s|W
E ,p)
Lsns
. (15)
Since lims→0 ψ(s|W
E ,p)
s = I(p : W
E), the rate maxp I(p :
WB)− I(p :WE) can be asymptotically attained.
When the sacrifice information rate is R, i.e., Ln ∼= enR,
the decreasing rate of Eve’s information is greater than
eψ(R|W
E , p) := max0≤s≤1 sR − ψ(s|W
E , p). Hayashi [8]
derived another lower bound of this exponential decreasing
rate eφ(R|WE , p) := max0≤s≤1/2 sR− φ(s|WE , p).
IV. COMPARISON WITH EXISTING BOUND
Now, we compare the two upper bounds e
ψ(s|WE,p)
Lss and
eφ(s|W
E,p)
Lss for 0 < s ≤ 1. Ho¨lder inequality with the
measurable space (X , p) is given as
|
∑
x∈X
p(x)X(x)Y (x)|
≤(
∑
x∈X
p(x)|X(x)|
1
1−s )1−s(
∑
x∈X
p(x)|Y (x)|
1
s )s.
6Using this inequality, we obtain∑
x
p(x)(Wx(y))
1+sWp(y)
−s
=
∑
x
p(x)Wx(y)(
Wx(y)
Wp(y)
)s
≤
(∑
x
p(x)(Wx(y))
1
1−s
)1−s(∑
x
p(x)
Wx(y)
Wp(y)
)s
=
(∑
x
p(x)(Wx(y))
1
1−s
)1−s
.
Taking the summand concerning y, we obtain
eψ(s|W
E ,p) ≤ eφ(s|W
E ,p). (16)
That is, our upper bound is better than that given by [8]. Thus,
eψ(R|W
E , p) ≥ eφ(R|W
E , p).
Next, in order to consider the case when the privacy ampli-
fication rate R is close to the mutual information I(p :W ), we
treat the difference between these bounds with the limit s→ 0.
In this case, we take their Taylor expansions as follows.∑
x,y
pxWx(y)
1+sWp(y)
−s
∼=1 + I(p :W )s+ I2(p :W )s
2 + I3(p :W )s
3
∑
y
(∑
x
pxWx(y)
1
1−s
)1−s
∼=1 + I(p :W )s+ I2(p :W )s
2 + (I3(p : W ) + I˜3(p :W ))s
3,
where
I2(p : W ) :=
1
2
∑
x,y
pxWx(y)(logWx(y)− logWp(y))
2
I3(p : W ) :=
1
6
∑
x,y
pxWx(y)(logWx(y)− logWp(y))
3
I˜3(p : W ) :=
1
2
∑
y
(∑
x
pxWx(y)(logWx(y))
2
−
(
∑
x pxWx(y) logWx(y))
2
Wp(y)
)
.
Indeed, applying the Schwarz inequality to the inner product
〈f, g〉 :=
∑
x pxWx(y)f(y)g(y), we obtain
(
∑
x
pxWx(y)(logWx(y))
2) · (
∑
x
pxWx(y))
≥(
∑
x
pxWx(y) logWx(y))
2.
Since
∑
x pxWx(y) = Wp(x), this inequality implies that
I˜3(p :W ) ≥ 0. That is, eψ(s|W
E ,p) is smaller than eφ(s|WE ,p)
only in the third order when s is small.
Next, we consider a more specific case. A channel WE
is called additive when there exists a distribution such that
WEx (z) = P (z − x). In this case, e
ψ(s|WE,p)
Lss can be sim-
plified as follows. When X = Z and X is a module and
Wx(z) = W0(z−x) = P (z−x), the channel W is called ad-
ditive. The quantities eψ(R|WE , pmix) and eφ(R|WE , pmix)
are characterized as follows. Since
eψ(s|W
E ,pmix) = |X |se−H˜1+s(X|P ) (17)
eφ(t|W
E ,pmix) = |X |te
−(1−t)H˜
1+ t
1−t
(X|P )
, (18)
we obtain
eψ(R|W
E , pmix) = max
0≤s≤1
s(R− log |X |) + H˜1+s(X |P )
= max
0≤s≤1
s(R− log |X |+H1+s(X |P ))
≥ max
0≤s≤1
s(R− log |X |) + H˜1+s(X |P )
1 + s
= max
0≤s≤1
s(R− log |X |+H1+s(X |P ))
1 + s
= eφ(R|W
E , pmix),
where t = s1+s . Fig. 1 shows the comparison
of eψ(R|WE , pmix) and eφ(R|WE , pmix) with
eψ,2(R|W
E , pmix) := (R − log |X |) + H2(X |P ),
which is directly obtained from Bennett et al[7].
When R − log |X | ≥ − ddsH˜1+s(X |P )|s=1,
eψ(R|W
E , pmix) = eψ,2(R|W
E , pmix).
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Fig. 1. Normal line: eψ(R|WE , pmix) (The present paper), Thick
line: eφ(R|WE , pmix) (Hayashi[8]), Dashed line: eψ,2(R|WE , pmix)
(Bennett et al[7]). p = 0.2, log 2 − h(p) = 0.192745, log |X | −
d
ds
H˜1+s(X|P )|s=1 = 0.388457.
Next, we consider a more general case. Eve is assumed to
have two random variables z ∈ X and z′. The first random
variable z is the output of an additive channel depending
on the second variable z′. That is, the channel WEx (z, z′)
can be written as WEx (z, z′) = PX,Z
′
(z − x, z′), where
PX,Z
′ is a joint distribution. Hereinafter, this channel model is
called a general additive channel. This channel is also called
a regular channel[9]. For this channel model, the inequality
eψ(R|W
E , pmix) ≥ eφ(R|W
E , pmix) holds because
eψ(s|W
E ,pmix) = |X |se−H˜1+s(X|Z
′|PX,Z
′
) (19)
eφ(t|W
E ,pmix) = |X |te
−(1−t)H˜
1+ t
1−t
(X|Z′|PX,Z
′
)
.
V. WIRE-TAP CHANNEL WITH LINEAR CODING
In a practical sense, we need to take into account the
decoding time. For this purpose, we often restrict our codes
to linear codes. In the following, we consider the case where
7the sender’s space X has the structure of a module. First, we
regard a submodule C1 ⊂ X as an encoding for the usual
sent message, and focus on its decoding {Dx}x∈C1 by the
authorized receiver. We construct a code for a wire-tap channel
ΦC1,C2 = (|C1/C2|, {Q[x]}[x]∈C1/C2 , {D[x]}[x]∈C1/C2) based
on a submodule C2 of C1 as follows. The encoding Q[x] is
given as the uniform distribution on the coset [x] := x+ C2,
and the decoding D[x] is given as the subset ∪x′∈x+C2Dx′ .
Next, we assume that a submodule C2(X) of C1 with car-
dinality |C2(X)| = L is generated by a random variable X
satisfying the following condition.
Condition 3: Any element x 6= 0 ∈ C1 is included in
C2(X) with probability at most L|C1| .
Then, the performance of the constructed code is evaluated
by the following theorem.
Theorem 4: Choose the subcode C2(X) according to Con-
dition 3. We construct the code ΦC1,C2(X) by choosing the
distribution Q[x] to be the uniform distribution on [x] for
[x] ∈ C1/C2(X). Then, we obtain
EXIE(ΦC1,C2(X)) ≤
eψ(s|W
E ,Pmix,C1 )
Lss
0 < ∀s < 1, (20)
where Pmix,S is the uniform distribution on the subset S.
Proof: This inequality can be shown by (3) as fol-
lows. Now, we define the joint distribution P (x, z) :=
Pmix,C1(x)W
E
x (z). The choice of Q[x] corresponds to a hash-
ing operation satisfying Condition 1. Then, (3) yields that
EXIE(ΦC1,C2(X)) is bounded by
|C1|
s∑
x,z P (z,x)
1+sP (z)−s
Lss =
e
ψ(s|WE,Pmix,C1
)
Lss , which implies (20).
Next, we assume that a submodule C1(Y) of with cardi-
nality |C1(Y)| = ML is generated by a random variable Y
satisfying the following condition.
Condition 4: The relation |C1(Y)| = ML always holds.
Any element x 6= 0 ∈ X is included in C1(Y) with probability
at most M|X | .
Choose the subcode C1(Y) and C2(X) according to Con-
ditions 4 and 3. Then, as is shown in Appendix E, we obtain
EX,YIE(ΦC1(Y),C2(X)) ≤
eψ(s|W
E ,Pmix,X )
Lss
, 0 < ∀s < 1.
(21)
Next, we consider a special class of channels. When the
channel WE is additive, i.e., WEx (z) = P (z−x), (17) implies
EX,YIE(ΦC1(Y),C2(X)) ≤
|X |se−H˜1+s(X|P )
Lss
(22)
for 0 < ∀s ≤ 1. In this case, the equation
ψ(s|WE , Pmix,C1+x) = ψ(s|W
E , Pmix,C1) holds for any x.
Thus, (16) and the concavity of eφ(s|WE ,p) (Lemma 1) imply
that
ψ(s|WE , Pmix,C1) ≤ φ(s|W
E , Pmix,C1) ≤ φ(s|W
E , Pmix,X ).
(23)
Thus, combining (20), (23), and (18), we obtain
EXIE(ΦC1,C2(X)) ≤
|X |se
−(1−s)H˜1+ s
1−s
(X|P )
Lss
(24)
for 0 < ∀s ≤ 1.
Similarly, when the channel WE is general additive, i.e.,
WEx (z, z
′) = PX,Z
′
(z − x, z′), we obtain
EXIE(ΦC1,C2(X)) ≤
|X |se
−(1−s)H˜1+ s
1−s
(X|Z′|PX,Z
′
)
Lss (25)
EX,YIE(ΦC1(Y),C2(X)) ≤
|X |se−H˜1+s(X|Z
′|PX,Z
′
)
Lss
(26)
for 0 < ∀s < 1.
In the following discussion, we assume that X is an n-
dimensional vector space Fnq over the finite field Fq . Then,
the subcode C2(X) of the random linear privacy amplification
can be constructed with small complexity. That is, when C1
is equivalent to Fmq , an ensemble of the subcodes C2(X)
satisfying Condition 3 can be generated from only the m− 1
independent random variables X1, . . . , Xm−1 on the finite
field Fq as follows.
When |C2(X)| = qk, we choose the subcode C2(X) as
the kernel of the the concatenation of Toeplitz matrix and the
identity (X, I) of the size m × (m − k) given in Appendix
B. Then, the encoding {Q[x]}[x]∈C1/C2(X) is constructed as
follows. When the sent message is x ∈ Fkq , it is transformed
to (b, x − Xb)T ∈ Fmq , where b = (b1, . . . , bk) are k inde-
pendent random variables. This process forms the encoding
{Q[x]}[x]∈C1/C2(X) because the set {(b,−Xb)T |b ∈ Fkq} is
equal to C2(X). This can be checked using the fact that
(X, I)(b, x − Xb)T = x and the set {(b,−Xb)T |b ∈ Fkq}
forms a k-dimensional space.
Therefore, if the error correcting code C1 can be constructed
with effective encoding and decoding times and WE is ad-
ditive or general additive, the code ΦC1,C2(X) for a wire-
tap channel satisfying the inequality (24) or (25) can be
constructed by using random linear privacy amplification.
Furthermore, for the n-fold discrete memoryless case of the
wire-tap channel WB,WE , it is possible to achieve the rate
I(Pmix,X :W
B)− I(Pmix,X :W
E) by a combination of this
error correcting and random linear privacy amplification when
an error correcting code attaining the Shannon rate I(Pmix,X :
WB) is available and the channel WE is general additive,
i.e., WEx (z, z′) = PX,Z
′
(z − x, z′). In this case, when the
sacrifice information rate is R, as follows from the discussion
of Section IV and (25), the exponent of Eve’s information
is greater than max0≤s≤1 s(R−log |X |)+H˜1+s(X|Z
′|PX,Z
′
)
1+s =
max0≤s≤1
s
1+s (R− log |X |+H1+s(X |Z
′|PX,Z
′
)).
This method is very useful when the channels WB and WE
are additive. However, even if the channels are not additive or
general additive, this method is still useful because it requires
only a linear code and random privacy amplification, which is
simpler requirement than that of the random coding method
given in the proof of Theorem 3 while this method cannot
attain the optimal rate.
VI. SECRET KEY AGREEMENT
Next, following Maurer[1], we apply the above discussions
to secret key agreement, in which, Alice, Bob, and Eve are
8assumed to have initial random variables a ∈ A, b ∈ B,
and e ∈ E , respectively. The task for Alice and Bob is
to share a common random variable almost independent of
Eve’s random variable e by using a public communication.
The quality is evaluated by three quantities: the size of the
final common random variable, the probability that their final
variables coincide, and the mutual information between Alice’s
final variables and Eve’s random variable. In order to construct
a protocol for this task, we assume that the set A has a module
structure (any finite set can be regarded as a cyclic group).
Then, the objective of secret key agreement can be realized
by applying the code of a wire-tap channel as follows. First,
Alice generates another uniform random variable x and sends
the random variable x′ := x− a. Then, the distribution of the
random variables b, x′ (e, x′) accessible to Bob (Eve) can be
regarded as the output distribution of the channel x 7→ WBx
(x 7→WEx ). The channels WB and WE are given as follows.
WBx (b, x
′) = PAB(x− x′, b)
WEx (e, x
′) = PAE(x− x′, e), (27)
where PAB(a, b) (PAE(a, e)) is the joint probability between
Alice’s initial random variable a and Bob’s (Eve’s) initial
random variable b (e). Hence, the channel WE is general
additive.
Applying Theorem 3 to the uniform distribution PAmix, for
any numbers M and L, there exists a code Φ such that
|Φ| = M
ǫB(Φ) ≤ 2 min
0≤s≤1
(ML)s|A|−se
−(1+s)H˜ 1
1+s
(A|B|PA,B)
IE(Φ) ≤ 2 min
0≤s≤1
|A|se−H˜1+s(A|E|P
A,E)
sLs
because eφ(−s|WB ,Pmix,A) = |A|−se
−(1+s)H˜ 1
1+s
(A|B|PA,B)
.
and ψ(s|WE , Pmix,A) = s log |A| − H˜1+s(A|E|PA,E) =
s(log |A| −H1+s(A|E|P
A,E)).
In particular, when X is an n-dimensional vector space
F
n
q over the finite field Fq and the joint distribution between
A and B(E) is the n-fold independent and identical dis-
tribution (i.i.d.) of PA,B (PA,E), respectively, the relation
H˜1+s(A
n|En|(PA,E)n) = nH˜1+s(A|E|P
A,E) holds. Thus,
there exists a code Φn for any integers Ln,Mn, and any
probability distribution p on X such that
|Φn| = Mn
ǫB(Φ) ≤ 2 min
0≤s≤1
(MnLn)
s|A|−nse
−n(1+s)H˜ 1
1+s
(A|B|PA,B)
IE(Φn) ≤ 2 min
0≤s≤1
|A|nse−nH˜1+s(A|E|P
A,E)
sLsn
. (28)
Hence, the achievable rate of this protocol is equal to
I(Pmix,A :W
B)− I(Pmix,A :W
E)
=H(PB) +H(Pmix,A)−H(P
A,B)
− (H(PE) +H(Pmix,A)−H(P
A,E))
=H(PB) +H(PA)−H(PA,B)
− (H(PE) +H(PA)−H(PA,E))
=I(A : B)− I(A : E) = H(A|E) −H(A|B),
which was obtained by Maurer[1] and Ahlswede-Csisza´r[2].
Here, since the channels WB and WE can be regarded as
general additive, we can apply the discussion in Section V.
That is, the bound (28) can be attained with the combination
of a linear code and random privacy amplification, which is
given in Section V.
VII. DISCUSSION
We have derived an upper bound for Eve’s information in
secret key generation from a common random number without
communication when a universal2 hash function is applied.
Since our bound is based on the Re´nyi entropy of order 1+ s
for s ∈ [0, 1], it can be regarded as an extension of Bennett et
al [7]’s result with the Re´nyi entropy of order 2.
Applying this bound to the wire-tap channel, we obtain an
upper bound for Eve’s information, which yields an exponen-
tial upper bound. This bound improves on the existing bound
[8]. Further, when the error correction code is given by a linear
code and when the channel is additive or general additive, the
privacy amplification is given by the concatenation of Toeplitz
matrix and the identity. Finally, our result has been applied to
secret key agreement with public communication.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
The concavity of x 7→ xs implies that
EXe
−H˜1+s(X|P◦f
−1
X
) = EX
M∑
i=1
P ◦ f−1
X
(i)P ◦ f−1
X
(i)s
=
∑
x
P (x)EX(
∑
x′:fX(x)=fX(x′)
P (x′))s
≤
∑
x
P (x)(EX
∑
x′:fX(x)=fX(x′)
P (x′))s.
Condition 1 guarantees that
EX
∑
x′:fX(x)=fX(x′)
P (x′) ≤P (x) +
∑
x 6=x′
P (x′)
1
M
≤P (x) +
1
M
.
Since any two positive numbers x and y satisfy (x + y)s ≤
xs + ys for 0 ≤ s ≤ 1,
(P (x) +
1
M
)s ≤ P (x)s +
1
M s
.
Hence,
EXe
−H˜1+s(X|P◦f
−1
X
) ≤
∑
x
P (x)(P (x)s +
1
M s
)
=
∑
x
P (x)1+s +
1
M s
= e−H˜1+s(X|P ) +
1
M s
.
Therefore, taking the expectation with respect to the random
variable E, we have
EXe
−H˜1+s(A|E|P
fX(A),E) ≤ e−H˜1+s(A|E|P
A,E) +
1
M s
. (29)
The concavity of the logarithm implies
H˜1+s(A|E|P
A,E) ≤ sH(A|E).
Thus, From (29), the concavity of the logarithm yields that
sEXH(fX(A)|E) ≥ EXH˜1+s(A|E|P
A,E)
≥− log EXe
−H˜1+s(A|E|P
A,E)
≥− log(e−H˜1+s(A|E|P
A,E) +
1
M s
)
=s logM − log(1 +M se−H˜1+s(A|E|P
A,E))
≥s logM −M se−H˜1+s(A|E|P
A,E),
where the last inequality follows from the logarithmic inequal-
ity log(1 + x) ≤ x. Therefore, we obtain (2).
APPENDIX B
TOEPLITZ MATRIX
The concatenation of Toeplitz matrix and the identity (X, I)
of size m× (m− k) on the finite filed Fq is given as follows.
First, we choose an m − 1 random variables X1, . . . , Xm−1
on the finite filed Fq. I is the (m − k) × (m − k) identity
matrix and the k × (m− k) matrix X = (Xi,j) is defined by
the m− 1 random variables X1, . . . , Xm−1 as follows.
Xi,j = Xi+j−1.
This matrix is called a Toeplitz matrix.
Now, we prove that the m×(m−k) matrices (X, I) satisfy
Condition 3. More precisely, we show the following. (1) An
element (x, y)T ∈ Fkq ⊕ F
−(m−k)
q belongs to the kernel of
(X, I) with probability qk if x 6= 0 and y 6= 0. (2) It does
not belong to the kernel of the m× (m− k) matrix (X, I) if
x = 0 and y 6= 0.
Indeed, since (2) is trivial, we will show (1). For x =
(x1, . . . , xk), we let i be the minimum index i such that xi 6=
0. We fix the k− i random variables Xi+(m−k)−1, . . . , Xm−1.
That is, we show that the element (x, y)T belongs to the
kernel with probability qk when the k − i random vari-
ables Xi+(m−k)−1, . . . , Xm−1 are fixed. Then, the condition
Xx + y = 0 can be expressed as the following m − k
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conditions.
Xix1 = −
k∑
j=i+1
Xjxj − y1
Xi+1x2 = −
k∑
j=i+1
Xj+1xj − y2
.
.
.
Xi+m−k−2xm−k−1 = −
k∑
j=i+1
Xj+m−k−2xj − ym−k−1
Xi+m−k−1xm−k = −
k∑
j=i+1
Xj+m−k−1xj − ym−k.
The (m − k)-th condition does not depend on the m − k −
1 variables Xi, . . . Xi+(m−k)−1. Hence, this condition only
depends on the variable Xi+m−k−1. Therefore, the (m−k)-th
condition holds with probability 1/q. Similarly, we can show
that the (m − k − 1)-th condition holds with probability 1/q
under the (m−k)-th condition. Thus, the (m−k)-th condition
and the (m− k − 1)-th condition hold with probability 1/q2.
Repeating this discussion inductively, we can conclude that all
m− k conditions hold with probability q−(m−k).
APPENDIX C
TWO LEAKED INFORMATION CRITERIA
In this appendix, we explain an example, in which, the
leaked information criterion based on the variational distance
is small but the leaked information criterion based on the
mutual information is large. This example is proposed by Shun
Watanabe[20]. The former criterion is given as [21]
d1(P
A,E , PAmix × P
E),
where PAmix is the uniform distribution on A and the variational
distance is given as d1(P,Q) :=
∑
x |P (x) − Q(x)|. Pinsker
inequality [22] guarantees that
d1(P
A,E, PAmix × P
E)
≤d1(P
A,E, PA × PE) + d1(P
A × PE , PAmix × P
E)
≤D(PA,E‖PA × PE)2 + d1(P
A, PAmix)
=I(A : E)2 + d1(P
A, PAmix),
where D(P‖Q) :=
∑
x P (x)(logP (x) − logQ(x)). This
inequality shows that when d1(PA, PAmix) and I(A : E)2 are
close to zero, d1(PA,E , PAmix × PE) is also close to zero.
Assume that the Eve’s distribution PE is the uniform
distribution, and E = A. For any small real number ǫ > 0,
we define a subset S ⊂ E such that PE(S) = 1 − ǫ. The
conditional distribution PA|E is assumed to be given as
PA|E(a|e) :=
{ 1
|E| if e ∈ S
δa,e if ∈ Sc,
where δa,e is 1 when a = e, and is 0 otherwise. Then, the
leaked information criterion based on the variational distance
is evaluated as
d1(P
A,E , PAmix × P
E) =
∑
e∈E
PE(e)d1(P
A|E , PAmix)
=
∑
e∈S
PE(e)d1(P
A|E , PAmix) +
∑
e∈Sc
PE(e)d1(P
A|E , PAmix)
≤2ǫ.
In oder to evaluate the leaked information criterion based on
the mutual information, we focus on the probability
Pe := P
A,E{a 6= e}.
Fano inequality[22] yields that
H(E|A) ≤ 1 + Pe log |E|.
Since Pe ≤ 1− ǫ,
I(A : E) = H(E)−H(E|A) ≥ H(E)− 1− Pe log |E|
= log |E| − 1− Pe log |E| ≥ −1 + ǫ log |E|.
In particular, when E = {0, 1}n2 and ǫ = 1n ,
d1(P
A,E , PAmix × P
E) ≤
2
n
, I(A : E) ≥ n− 1.
This example shows that even if d1(PA,E, PAmix × PE)
is close to zero, there is a possibility that I(A : E) is not
close to zero. Hence, we cannot guarantee the security based
on mutual information from the security based on variational
distance while we can guarantee the security based on varia-
tional distance from the security based on mutual information
when d1(PA, PAmix) is close to zero. Therefore, the leaked
information criterion based on the mutual information is more
restrictive than that based on variational distance.
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APPENDIX D
PROOF OF (12)
Since
I(p,W ) =
∑
x
p(x)D(WEx ‖W
E
p ) ≤
∑
x
p(x)D(WEx ‖Q) (30)
holds for any distribution Q,
EYEX|YIE(Φ(X,Y)
′) ≤ EYEX|Y
1
LM
LM∑
k=1
D(
1
L
∑
k′ :fX(k′)=fX(k)
WEfΦ(Y)(k′)‖W
E
p ) (31)
=EYEX|Y
1
LM
LM∑
k=1
∑
y
1
L
∑
k′′ :fX(k′′)=fX(k)
WEfΦ(Y)(k′′)(y)(log(
1
L
∑
k′:fX(k′)=fX(k)
WEfΦ(Y)(k′)(y))− logW
E
p (y))
=EYEX|Y
1
LM
LM∑
k=1
∑
y
WEfΦ(Y)(k)(y)(log(
1
L
∑
k′ :fX(k′)=fX(k)
WEfΦ(Y)(k′)(y))− logW
E
p (y))
≤EY
1
LM
LM∑
k=1
∑
y
WEfΦ(Y)(k)(y)(log(
1
L
WEfΦ(Y)(k)(y) + EX|Y
1
L
∑
k′ 6=k:fX(k′)=fX(k)
WEfΦ(Y)(k′)(y))− logW
E
p (y)) (32)
≤EY
1
LM
LM∑
k=1
∑
y
WEfΦ(Y)(k)(y)(log(
1
L
WEfΦ(Y)(k)(y) +
1
ML
∑
k′ 6=k
WEfΦ(Y)(k′)(y))− logW
E
p (y)) (33)
=
1
LM
LM∑
k=1
∑
y
EYkW
E
fΦ(Y)(k)
(y)EY|Yk(log(
1
L
WEfΦ(Y)(k)(y) +
1
ML
∑
k′ 6=k
WEfΦ(Y)(k′)(y))− logW
E
p (y))
≤
1
LM
LM∑
k=1
∑
y
EYkW
E
fΦ(Y)(k)
(y)(log(
1
L
WEfΦ(Y)(k)(y) +
1
ML
EY|Yk
∑
k′ 6=k
WEfΦ(Y)(k′)(y))− logW
E
p (y)) (34)
≤
1
LM
LM∑
k=1
∑
y
EYkW
E
fΦ(Y)(k)
(y)(log(
1
L
WEfΦ(Y)(k)(y) +W
E
p (y))− logW
E
p (y)) (35)
=
1
LM
LM∑
k=1
∑
y
EYkW
E
fΦ(Y)(k)
(y) log(1 +
1
L
WEx (y)
WEp (y)
)
=
1
LM
LM∑
k=1
∑
y
∑
x∈X
p(x)WEx (y) log(1 +
1
L
WEx (y)
WEp (y)
) =
∑
y
∑
x∈X
p(x)WEx (y) log(1 +
1
L
WEx (y)
WEp (y)
),
where the random variable fΦ(Y)(k) is simplified to Yk. In the above derivation, (31) follows from (30), (32) and (34) follow
from the concavity of log x, and (33) and (35) follow from Conditions 1 and 2.
Since the inequalities (1 + x)s ≤ 1 + xs and log(1 + x) ≤ x hold for any positive x and 0 < s ≤ 1, the inequalities
log(1 + x) ≤
log(1 + x)s
s
≤
log(1 + xs)
s
≤
xs
s
(36)
hold. Using this inequality, we obtain∑
y
∑
x∈X
p(x)WEx (y) log(1 +
1
L
WEx (y)
WEp (y)
) ≤
∑
y
∑
x∈X
p(x)WEx (y)
1
sLs
WEx (y)
s
WEp (y)
s
) =
1
sLs
eψ(s|W
E ,p), (37)
which implies (12).
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APPENDIX E
PROOF OF (21)
Since
IE(ΦC1,C2(X)) =
∑
y
1
|C1|
∑
x′∈C1
WEx′ (y)(log(
1
|C2(X)|
∑
x′′:x′−x′′∈C2(X)
WEx′′(y))− log(
1
|C1|
∑
x′′′∈C1
WEx′′(y)))
≤
∑
y
1
|C1|
∑
x′∈C1
WEx′ (y)(log(
1
|C2(X)|
∑
x′′:x′−x′′∈C2(X)
WEx′′(y))− log(W
E
Pmix,X (y))),
we have
EYEX|YIE(ΦC1(Y),C2(X))
≤EYEX|Y
∑
y
1
ML
∑
x′∈C1(Y)
WEx′ (y)(log(
1
L
∑
x′′:x′−x′′∈C2(X)
WEx′′(y))− log(W
E
Pmix,X (y)))
=EYEX|Y
∑
y
1
ML
∑
x′∈C1(Y)
WEx′ (y)(log(
1
L
WEx′ (y) +
1
L
∑
x′′:x′−x′′∈C2(X),x′ 6=x′′
WEx′′(y))− log(W
E
Pmix,X (y)))
≤EY
∑
y
1
ML
∑
x′∈C1(Y)
WEx′ (y)(log(
1
L
WEx′ (y) + EX|Y
1
L
∑
x′′:x′−x′′∈C2(X),x′ 6=x′′
WEx′′(y))− log(W
E
Pmix,X (y))) (38)
≤EY
∑
y
1
ML
∑
x′∈C1(Y)
WEx′ (y)(log(
1
L
WEx′ (y) +
1
L
L
ML
∑
x′′∈C1\{x′}
WEx′′(y))− log(W
E
Pmix,X (y))) (39)
=
∑
y
1
|X |
∑
x′∈X
WEx′ (y)EY|x′∈C1(Y)(log(
1
L
WEx′ (y) +
1
ML
∑
x′′∈C1(Y)\{x′}
WEx′′(y))− log(W
E
Pmix,X (y)))
≤
∑
y
1
|X |
∑
x′∈X
WEx′ (y)(log(
1
L
WEx′ (y) +
1
ML
EY|x′∈C1(Y)
∑
x′′∈C1(Y)\{x′}
WEx′′(y))− log(W
E
Pmix,X (y))) (40)
≤
∑
y
1
|X |
∑
x′∈X
WEx′ (y)(log(
1
L
WEx′ (y) +
1
|X |
∑
x′′∈X\{x′}
WEx′′(y))− log(W
E
Pmix,X (y))) (41)
≤
∑
y
1
|X |
∑
x′∈X
WEx′ (y)(log(
1
L
WEx′ (y) +W
E
Pmix,X (y))− log(W
E
Pmix,X (y)))
=
∑
y
1
|X |
∑
x′∈X
WEx′ (y) log(1 +
1
L
WEx′ (y)
WEPmix,X (y)
),
where EY|C is the conditional expectation concerning the random variable X when the condition C holds. In the above
derivation, (38) and (40) follow from the concavity of log x, and (39) and (41) follow from Conditions 3 and 4.
Using (36), we obtain (21).
